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Introduction
This article critically examines the sudden emergence and expansionof Internet finance in China. Over the past decade, China’s Internetfinance industry has grown and diversified at a dizzying rate. Hun-
dreds of millions of people now use third-party online payment services to
complete financial transactions, turn to peer-to-peer (P2P) lending plat-
forms or online banks to borrow money, and sidestep brick-and-mortar fi-
nancial institutions to invest their savings in online investment funds (Guo,
Kong, and Wang 2016). This has marked a sea change in how commerce
operates in the country, and has transformed the ways in which people ac-
cess and interact with financial products. Prior to the Internet finance boom,
the Chinese financial system was dominated by state-owned institutions
operating partially based on political imperatives, rather than unrestrained
profit seeking. In China, formal banks are required to lend at below-market
interest rates, and have historically targeted larger enterprises and local gov-
ernments with their loans, making it difficult for households or small busi-
nesses to gain access to credit (Ong 2012). The rise of Internet finance has
dramatically changed this situation. With the government being slow to
issue regulations on the provision of digital financial services, Internet fi-
nance providers have had much more freedom to operate than traditional
brick-and-mortar financial institutions. This has resulted in vastly expanded
coverage to previously excluded groups in both rural and urban areas. In
China today, all that is needed to gain access to (semi)formal savings and
credit is a smartphone.
China’s rapidly evolving Internet finance industry is characterised by di-
versity and innovation, with a huge number of providers entering the market
in an attempt to capitalise on the sudden liberalisation of financial service
provision in the country. This has resulted in the development of a wide
range of loan and investment products targeting a diverse client base—
ranging from poor and marginalised rural populations to large urban enter-
prises in search of investment capital (Guo, Kong, and Wang 2016). Digital
loans are primarily provided by two types of Internet finance institutions:
online banks and P2P platforms. Online banks—such as WeBank (30%
owned by Tencent) and MyBank (30% owned by Ant Financial of the Alibaba
Group)—target those involved in e-commerce platforms, including Taobao
shop owners and customers, using their online transactions to determine
creditworthiness. Currently these banks are only in the business of providing
loans, which vary in size from a few thousand to millions of yuan, at rates
slightly higher than brick-and-mortar banks. However their ultimate goal is
to become full deposit-taking financial institutions. (1) China’s P2P market
is the world’s largest, with almost 6,000 P2P platforms facilitating transac-
tions worth approximately one trillion yuan in 2016. Some large platforms,
such as Paipaidai, serve more than two million active borrowers and
lenders. (2) P2P platforms are theoretically only supposed to act as interme-
diaries, providing a service allowing lenders to offer credit directly to bor-
rowers. However, in reality a wide range of P2P platforms operate in very
different ways. In some cases platforms pool lender funds and engage in
asset transformation, thus creating a space between the lender and the bor-
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rower (Deer, Mi, and Yu 2015). These types of practices have resulted in
fraudulent activity and some high-profile bankruptcies (see section four),
and have prompted a regulatory crackdown. (3) While this has restricted the
behaviour of P2P platforms and somewhat consolidated the industry, space
still remains for disruptive (or chaotic) innovation.
P2P platforms must be understood as vehicles for both credit and invest-
ment, as lenders use P2P services as an alternative to parking their capital in
low-interest savings accounts. While engaging in P2P lending can be a rela-
tively risky activity, it offers substantially higher returns than traditional types
of investment. Moreover, some P2P platforms provide the option of fixed re-
turns over a specific period of time, mimicking investment products offered
by brick-and-mortar financial institutions, and giving the illusion of security. (4)
Nevertheless, the recent collapse of large P2P platforms has negatively af-
fected the industry’s reputation, and industry trackers estimate that at least
one-third of platforms have financial problems or engage in fraudulent activity
(Jingu 2016). This has prompted would-be investors to look elsewhere. 
Online investment funds offered by China’s Internet giants are another op-
tion for those too risk-averse to enter the P2P market. These online funds per-
mit investors to transfer any amount of money into their accounts, which is
then invested directly in the interbank market, providing relatively high re-
turns. For instance, Ant Financial’s Yu’ebao offers an annual interest rate of
close to 4%, compared with only 0.35% provided by most traditional banks.
Investors can also withdraw the money whenever they want, and even use
their accounts to settle online transactions. This situation has resulted in on-
line investment funds vacuuming up huge amounts of savings that would
have previously been deposited in brick-and-mortar financial institutions, and
has made Yu’ebao the world’s largest investment fund, managing over US$165
billion from more than 260 million investors. (5) This represents a challenge to
traditional banking, and has prompted some brick-and-mortar financial in-
stitutions to respond by developing their own online investment products. (6)
The reaction to China’s Internet finance boom has been largely uncritical
and depicted in positive terms. Indeed, many of the discussions in academic,
media, and policy circles have characterised the rapid diversification and ex-
pansion of digital financial services as providing much-needed access to credit,
and pushing traditional banks to improve their services through competi-
tion—both of which are seen as contributing positively to the country’s de-
velopment (Arner, Barberis, and Buckley 2015). (7) This mirrors the discourse
of the global financial inclusion movement, which promotes the expansion
of access to financial services as a strategy to empower marginal populations
and drive bottom-up socioeconomic development (Sparreboom and Duflos
2012; World Bank 2014). (8) Proponents of financial inclusion depict fraud and
abuses associated with digital finance as growing pains for a rapidly expanding
industry—unfortunate outcomes that can be remedied with proper regula-
tion and technocratic fixes, rather than fundamental features of a commer-
cially-oriented Internet financial system. These negative outcomes are also
seen as a small price to pay in order to allow China’s digital financial sphere
to continue innovating, with one commentator even going so far as to say: 
Chinese innovations like printing, gunpowder and the magnet spread
worldwide and fundamentally changed the world as it then was. Sim-
ilarly, the ripples from the current golden era of internet finance are
likely to be felt well beyond China’s borders. (9)
Implied in statements like this is the idea that China is at the vanguard of
Internet financial innovation that will shape the world for the good. How-
ever, the seemingly inadvertent use of gunpowder in this metaphor—an in-
novation that undoubtedly has had tyrannous results—also points to the
potential dark sides of this innovation. 
This article examines the dark manifestations of China’s digital financial
innovation and expansion. This is accomplished through an analysis of some
of the discontents and tyrannies that have arisen from the rapid expansion
of digital financial inclusion in contemporary China. It is important to note
at the outset that the analysis in this article does not draw on primary em-
pirical data. Rather, it seeks to extend a conceptual critique of the discourse
and practice of digital financial inclusion in China by bringing theoretically
informed critical perspectives to bear on recent high-profile instances of
exploitation, fraud, and the expansion of the Chinese surveillance state. The
rest of the article is organised as follows: the next section outlines the de-
velopment and goals of the global financial inclusion movement, and high-
lights a number of normative claims that have been made about the
benefits associated with expanding access to financial services. Sections
three, four, and five detail three examples of how digital financial inclusion
can manifest in tyrannous ways, having negative consequences for the
newly included and potentially impacting the wider society and economy
in adverse ways. Section six concludes the paper by reflecting on the pat-
terns of inequality and exploitation that are reproduced through processes
of inclusion, and identifying some important areas for future research.
The promise of financial inclusion
The idea that inclusion into the formal financial system is inherently ben-
eficial derives from, and overlaps with, the rapid expansion and popularisa-
tion of the global microfinance movement over the past half-century.
Modern microlending began with US-funded development programmes in
Latin America in the 1960s, primarily aimed at stymying leftist uprisings.
However, popular microfinance mythology places the movement’s origins
in Muhammad Yunus’ experiments with lending to the poor in rural
Bangladesh, and the establishment of the Grameen Bank in 1983 (Bateman
2015; Yunus and Weber 2007). Throughout the 1980s, Grameen and other
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microfinance institutions adopted a poverty lending approach aimed at pro-
viding small, subsidised loans to poor, unbanked populations though joint-
liability loan groups rather than requiring collateral. Because the loans were
offered at below market rates, these initial microfinance providers were not
financially sustainable, and instead depended on the patronage of funders
(Morduch 2008). This all changed in the 1990s through a concerted effort—
led by the World Bank, USAID, and other pillars of the global neoliberal es-
tablishment—to push microfinance institutions to operate at “full cost
recovery” (Bateman 2015, p. 6). Proponents of this new financial systems
approach argued that microfinance providers should abandon subsidised
interest rates, and adopt commercial best practices. This would provide the
basis for sustainability (and even profitability), allowing them to scale-up
their operations and expand the benefits of microfinance to more people
(Robinson 2008; Rutherford 2006).
The widespread adoption of the financial systems approach, and the sub-
sequent transformation of microfinance into a commercially-oriented ac-
tivity, laid the foundations for the rapid growth of the industry. With
high-profile backing and funding from development institutions—such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation—microfinance became the best funded and
most popular development intervention of all time (Bateman 2010). The
IMF in particular found microfinance to be a useful tool to soften the edges
of its Structural Adjustment Programmes (i.e. austerity measures) imposed
on low-income countries in need of financial assistance (Weber 2004). Mi-
crofinance became seen as a win-win proposition, as it supposedly helped
the poor while simultaneously generating profit-making opportunities for
investors. The developmental capabilities of microfinance were expressed
in hyperbolic terms, with Yunus himself claiming that it would contribute
to putting poverty in a museum within a few decades (Yunus and Weber
2007). By the 2000s, microfinance was the global development strategy
par excellence, leading the United Nations to declare 2005 the International
Year of Microcredit. One year later, Yunus and the Grameen Bank were the
recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, and President Barack Obama awarded
Yunus the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2009. (10)
However, in the mid to late 2000s microfinance came under increasing
scrutiny and critique, with a number of studies finding no evidence for the
claims of poverty reduction, and some research highlighting the ways in
which microcredit could actually hurt borrowers and undermine develop-
ment (Bateman 2010; Duvendack et al. 2011; Guérin, Morvant-Roux, and
Villarreal 2014; Guérin, Labie, and Servet 2015; Mader and Sabrow 2015).
The microfinance industry’s reputation was further damaged by a massive
microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India, resulting in over-indebted bor-
rowers committing suicide (Taylor 2011). This prompted a recalibration and
rebranding of the microfinance industry, shifting the goal from actively re-
ducing poverty through small loans, to focusing on financial inclusion, with
the expansion of access to financial services being depicted as a beneficial
outcome in and of itself. Like microfinance before it, the discourse of finan-
cial inclusion received the full support of the major neoliberal development
institutions, as well as large financial multinationals such as MasterCard
and Citibank. By 2014 financial inclusion had taken up the mantel of mi-
crofinance, and was the main focus of the World Bank’s 2014 Global Finan-
cial Development Report, which stated: “Financial inclusion represents a
core topic, given its implications for reducing poverty and boosting shared
prosperity” (World Bank 2014, p. xi). The shift to the promotion of financial
inclusion signalled the full embrace of a profit-oriented approach to devel-
opmental finance. This was justified as creating the conditions necessary to
allow commercial financial institutions to scale-up their businesses and
reach more clients. These goals are made clear in a report released by the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), in which Elizabeth Littlefield
(CEO of the CGAP) stated (Helms 2006, p. 5): 
We have helped push microfinance beyond the conference rooms of
aid agencies, to the boardrooms of commercial bankers and policy-
makers (…) the picture so far is breathtaking. Where small, heavily
subsidized microcredit schemes used to be the norm, hundreds of
profitable microfinance providers of all institutional shapes and forms
are now offering a wide range of financial services. 
This long journey from the provision of small subsidised microcredit to a
concerted global campaign to extend access to commercial financial ser-
vices to every person in the world may seem like mission drift, but it is
premised on one core assumption: That inclusion into the formal financial
system is inherently beneficial. This assumption is based on the observation
that “there is a direct correlation between financial exclusion and poverty”
(IFAD 2001, p. 8). By extension, therefore, inclusion is seen as correlating
with the opposite of poverty—prosperity. Proponents of financial inclusion
concede that expanding the provision of commercial financial services “at
all costs” may have immediate negative effects and “can actually exacerbate
financial and economic instability” (World Bank 2014, p. xi). However, sub-
optimal outcomes are blamed on the failure to follow best practice, and
are therefore depicted as exceptional results that can be remedied with
technocratic fixes. Digital technologies are seen as one of the key ways to
reduce these risks by “increasing financial security” (World Bank 2014, p. 3),
and Internet finance is at the core of the financial inclusion agenda. Accord-
ing to the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI): 
As one of the greatest innovations that has facilitated financial in-
clusion in this decade, digital finance, including mobile payments, In-
ternet banking, P2P lending, online insurance, crowdfunding etc., has
successfully improved access to finance by the poor, the elderly, the
young, women, farmers, SMEs and other under-served groups. (11)
As Philip Mader points out, the financial inclusion strategy is not based
on concrete evidence of its ability to achieve specific developmental out-
comes, e.g. poverty reduction (Mader 2016b). Rather, it is based on the un-
locking of developmental potential by providing the unbanked with new
opportunities. In particular, the discourse of beneficial financial inclusion is
rooted in three promises. The first promise is that inclusion into the formal
financial system is empowering for the unbanked, allowing them to pull
themselves up by their own bootstraps. In the words of the CGAP (Helms
2006, p. xi): 
We have seen the cascading power of microfinance. We have seen
how access to loans and deposit services has empowered millions of
people to work their way out of poverty. 
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The second promise is that this empowerment also serves to generate
more freedom by democratising access to financial services and liberating
the marginal from an excluded existence. Indeed, Yunus has frequently re-
ferred to financial exclusion as “financial apartheid,” and has called credit a
basic human right, thereby equating the lack of access to formal financial
services with systems of racism and oppression (Mader 2015; Yunus and
Weber 2007, p. 49). The third promise is that widening access to financial
services drives broader economic growth through bottom-up development,
which has beneficial knock-on effects for society as a whole. In the words
of Yunus (Yunus and Weber 2007, p. 56): 
Microcredit turns on the economic engines among the rejected pop-
ulation of society. Once a large number of these tiny engines start
working, the stage is set for big things. 
Financial inclusion has also become a key development strategy in China.
Microfinance gained popularity as a development intervention in the coun-
try in the 1990s, with the establishment of a number of microfinance NGOs
and the incorporation of microcredit into the government’s development
strategies. While China’s NGO microfinance sector remained small com-
pared to other countries—primarily due to regulations restricting the pro-
vision of financial services by NGOs—government-run microcredit
programmes aimed at providing loans for poverty reduction, farmers, and
laid-off workers expanded rapidly (Park and Ren 2001; Tsai 2004). In the
early 2000s, the Chinese government initiated a programme mandating
that all rural credit cooperatives (over 30,000 branches in total) must use
at least 60% of their lending capital for subsidised microcredit, making it
one of the largest microcredit initiatives in the world (Loubere 2016). In
2005, the China Association of Microfinance (CAM) was established in the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) with funding support from
Citibank and other multinational commercial financial institutions. CAM
and other advocates of microfinance in China identified the widespread use
of informal financial services in poor rural areas as undermining develop-
ment efforts, and lobbied for de-regulation in order to allow commercial fi-
nancial institutions to enter the rural market (Sparreboom and Duflos
2012). In particular, microfinance proponents pushed for the liberalisation
of interest rates and privatisation of land rights for use as collateral (OECD
2003). In 2006 and 2007, this lobbying partially paid off with the legalisa-
tion of two new types of financial institution—Village and Township Banks
(VTBs) and Microloan Companies (MLCs) —which were allowed to lend at
higher interest rates. This move effectively opened up the rural financial
sector to commercial banking, with major global banks such as HSBC and
Citibank establishing branches around the country (Loubere and Zhang
2015). The term financial inclusion was imported into China in 2005 after
its popularisation globally. It was translated from World Bank documents
by Bai Chengyu (Secretary General of CAM) as puhui jinrong (普惠金融).
Bai suggests that the Chinese translation actually refers to “inclusive fi-
nance,” which implies a focus on the wider system, rather than on providers
or services. This is perhaps meant to leave the door open for a larger gov-
ernmental role in coordinating the inclusive financial system. China’s Inter-
net finance boom has also been incorporated into financial inclusion
strategies. In the words of Bai: 
Inclusive finance and Internet finance have a lot in common, being
open, inclusive and equal. Internet finance reaches the bottom of the
financial sector, and heightens financial inclusion, while financial in-
clusion serves as policy guidance for Internet-based financing. (12)
The discourse of financial inclusion has been explicitly linked to the Chi-
nese government’s other developmental agendas. In 2015, the State Council
issued the first national strategic plan to promote financial inclusion, which
was approved by the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening
Reforms (chaired by Xi Jinping). The document identifies financial inclusion
as a key element in the realisation of a “moderately prosperous society”
(xiaokang shehui 小康社会) and commits to letting market forces lead with
governmental guidance. It also connects Internet finance to the inclusive
finance agenda, highlighting the importance of “improving the application
of technology in financial institutions (…) [and] leveraging the internet to
promote the development of financial inclusion.” (13) The government’s 2017
Number One Document (yihao wenjian 一号文件) also emphasises the im-
portance of expanding digital financial inclusion for the promotion of rural
development: 
We should encourage the active use of Internet technology by fi-
nancial institutions in order to offer micro-deposits, microloans, pay-
ments, settlements, insurance, and other types of financial services
to agricultural producers. (14)
While much has been made of the regulatory crackdown on Internet fi-
nance providers in 2016, it is worth pointing out that the policies have still
been largely supportive, and have left plenty of room for the continued de-
velopment of the industry. (15) The Chinese government has signalled its sup-
port for the digital financial inclusion agenda in other ways as well. For
instance, Premier Li Keqiang attended the launch of Tencent’s WeBank, re-
portedly saying that the development of Internet banking “will lower costs
for and deliver practical benefits to small clients, while forcing traditional
financial institutions to accelerate reforms.” (16)
With this high-level encouragement, Internet finance companies have
been quick to incorporate the language and symbolism of financial inclusion
into their marketing strategies, thus framing their commercial activities as
being widely beneficial to society. For instance, Ant Financial’s website
states: 
With the help of Big Data, cloud computing and other technologies,
users can enjoy equal access to financial services. This greatly ex-
pands the scope of inclusive financial services. (17)
12 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 7 / 4
12. Bai Chengyu, “The Origin and Role of Inclusive Finance in China,” op. cit.
13. State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa tuijin puhui jirong fazhan guihu (2016—2020 nian) de
tongzhi” (The State Council on the publication and promotion of plan for the development of fi-
nancial inclusion 2016-2020), 31 December 2015, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-
01/15/content_10602.htm (accessed 2 November 2017).
14. State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu shenru tuijin nongye gongjice jiegou xing gaige jiakuai peiyu
nongye nongcun fazhan xin dongneng de ruogan yijian” (Opinions on deepening the promotion
of supply side structural agriculture reform to accelerate the cultivation new energy for rural de-
velopment), 31 December 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-02/05/c_112
0413568.htm (accessed on 2 November 2017).
15. China Banking Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Public
Security Bureau, and China Internet Information Technology Office, “Wangluo jiedai xinxi zhongjie
jigou yewu huodong guanli zhanxing banfa” (Interim measures for the management of the busi-
ness activities of Internet lending intermediaries), 2016, op. cit.
16. “Banking and Finance in China: The Outlook for 2015,” PwC, 2015, op. cit., p. 38.
17. See the homepage of Ant Financial: https://www.antfin.com/brand.htm (accessed on 2 November
2017).
Special feature
It also displays a series of photographs, each with its own story, showing
the different kinds of people who benefit from the expanded access to fi-
nancial services offered by the company—including entrepreneurs, trav-
ellers, farmers, freelancers, and recent university graduates. CreditEase—one
of the largest P2P companies in the country—also characterises its activities
as financial inclusion on its website, and even incorporates the Chinese term
for inclusive finance into its name—yixin puhui (宜信普惠). (18)
Inclusive lending and (dis)empowerment
While the discussions surrounding China’s booming Internet finance in-
dustry and the associated expansion of digital financial inclusion have been
largely framed in positive terms, there have also been a number of high-
profile examples of negative outcomes related to the increased access to
financial services. One of the most visible discontents in recent years was
the eruption of the “naked borrowing” (luotiao jiedai 裸条借贷) scandal in
the summer of 2016. In June, media outlets in China and abroad reported
that female university students were being required to provide nude photos
of themselves, along with the contact details of friends and family members,
as collateral for loans at high interest borrowed through the widely used
P2P platform Jiedaibao. (19) When the students were unable to repay, they
were forced to take out additional loans at even more usurious rates. If they
did not comply, the lenders threatened to publish the photos online and
send them to their social/familial networks. Additional reporting on the
subject revealed that this practice was not restricted to Jiedaibao, but was
widespread across a number of other P2P platforms. The digital loan sharks
were actually middlemen who raised money from a number of different
sources before on-lending to desperate students (Loubere 2017). (20) Shock-
ingly, at the time of writing the use of naked photos to secure online loans
was not even illegal, as long as the naked pictures were not actually shared.
While this is undoubtedly an extreme example of the exploitative potential
of digital financial inclusion, it also sheds light on the lack of regulatory pro-
tections for consumers. Indeed, recent regulations do not specify what can
and cannot be used to guarantee loans, instead leaving it up to individual
platforms to find “innovative” ways to reduce risk. (21)
Once trapped in a cycle of debt and threatened with the public exposure
of naked images, the students are powerless at the hands of the digital loan
sharks—transformed into subordinated subjects primed for exploitation.
This has resulted in some girls being pushed into prostitution, either with
the loan sharks themselves or being marketed as mistresses for hire. (22) A
number of students have also committed suicide or gone missing due to
the inescapable debt, with others talking about receiving threats from debt
collection companies hired by lending platforms to retrieve their money. (23)
The government has since outlawed online loans to students and instructed
state-owned banks to resume campus lending at subsidised rates—a prac-
tice that had been halted for the past 18 years. (24) As mentioned above, the
government has also promulgated sweeping new regulations aimed at con-
trolling these blatant abuses. However, they have left plenty of grey areas
open, allowing space for those with enough entrepreneurial spirit to con-
tinue identifying new ways to make profit and push forward the develop-
ment of the Internet finance industry (Loubere 2017).
The ban may reduce high-profile stories about university students falling
victim to digital loan sharks in the future. However, it will not put an end
to the issue at the heart of the scandal: i.e., in order to provide credit to
marginal people who represent a risk for repayment, borrowers whose op-
erations are based on profit-maximising principles will seek ways to ensure
repayment, or extract something of similar (or greater) value from their
debtors in the case of default. For this reason, this example represents a
fundamental flaw in the beneficial financial inclusion narrative. The “naked
borrowing” scandal is undoubtedly a story of increased inclusion, as prior
to the rapid expansion of the P2P industry college students were barred
from getting loans from formal banks. It is also a story of empowerment—
just not for the formerly excluded students, but rather for their creditors.
Indeed, one of the real beneficiaries of a more inclusive financial system is
the entrepreneurial digital loan shark whose ability to participate is due to
liberalisation of the financial sphere in China. Therefore, these newly in-
cluded digital lenders must be understood as navigating the expanding fron-
tiers of financial inclusion—in this case transforming debt into new levers
of control in order to literally gain power over the bodies of their debtors.
This example contradicts the myth of financial inclusion as a great equaliser,
showing instead that inclusion tends to reproduce and strengthen unequal
relations of power, rather than reduce them (Taylor 2012).
Inclusive (anti)development
Inclusion into the rapidly evolving world of Internet finance also represents
a variety of other risks for consumers and the economy more broadly. It is
estimated that approximately one-third of P2P lenders are in financial trou-
ble, and since 2011 thousands of P2P platforms have gone bust, many due
to fraudulent practices (Jingu 2016). (25) Some of these were extremely large
operations—such as Ezubao, which had pulled in over 70 billion yuan from
nearly one million individuals who had invested money under the illusion
that it would be on-lent to borrowers providing high returns. In reality, the
founder of Ezubao embezzled much of the money for personal use. When
the platform went bankrupt, it was these investors who lost their money.
P2P platforms like Ezubao have been successful at attracting investors for
a couple of reasons. Firstly, they promise interest rates much higher than
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those offered by brick-and-mortar financial institutions. Secondly, many in-
vestors seem to equate the P2P platforms with the implicitly state-guar-
anteed formal financial sector, and do not fully realise the risks involved.
Ezubao recognised this, going to great lengths to cloak itself in the symbol-
ism and legitimacy of the state. The company advertised on CCTV, used of-
ficial-sounding language on its website, and even hosted its annual meeting
at the Great Hall of the People in 2015 (Albrecht et al. 2017; Loubere
2017). (26) Ezubao’s collapse therefore came as a shock to many who had
assumed that the company had the backing and support of the government
in the same way as brick-and-mortar financial institutions.
This type of scam is not only a threat to the newly included individual con-
sumers who were victims of the fraudulent investment operation. It also rep-
resents a threat to wider financial stability, as the new regulations have
required Internet lending platforms to store their funds in officially registered
banks, thus pushing them to become more fully integrated into the formal
financial sector. Moreover, P2P lenders are increasingly establishing partner-
ships with banks and integrating their platforms into bank business activities
(Deer, Mi, and Yu 2015; Loubere 2017). While this formalisation of the P2P
sector will undoubtedly curb some of the more audacious examples of fraud,
the ability of P2P lenders to generate higher profits will also surely pressure
traditional financial institutions into adopting new—often more risky—be-
haviours. Past financial crises have shown that it is the poor and more vul-
nerable members of society who are disproportionately affected by the kinds
of boom-bust cycles associated with the rapid expansion of under-regulated
and aggressively profit-oriented lending. In particular, examples from col-
lapses in the Indian and South African microfinance industries point to the
potential for financial inclusion initiatives to quickly become giant bubbles
fuelled by sub-prime lending, with terrible results for those at the bottom of
the pyramid (Bateman 2014; Mader 2015; Taylor 2011).
While these high-profile examples of fraud represent the illegal extraction
and theft of investor resources, the expansion of the Internet finance in-
dustry also gives rise to legally sanctioned forms of resource extraction from
marginal areas and people. Indeed, the commercial financial sector is gen-
erally in the business of attracting resources and allocating them to the
“most productive” places for investment. These havens of productivity are
mostly located in prosperous areas with well-developed infrastructure and
secure investment opportunities for the select few. Therefore, widening the
reach of the commercially-oriented Internet finance system to more
marginal areas and people allows for the financialisation and extraction of
their limited resources for use as investment capital in non-marginal places.
This represents a subtle form of accumulation by dispossession built into
the financial system itself (Harvey 2007; James 2014).
While these underlying extractive processes had already been exacerbated
through the liberalisation and commercialisation of China’s brick-and-mortar
financial institutions over the past decade (Loubere and Zhang 2015), they
have been dramatically accelerated by the unabashed profit orientation of
those participating in the Internet finance boom. For instance, research has
illustrated that electronic payment systems—such as Alipay and WeChat
Pay—facilitate transfers of wealth from the poor to rich segments of society
through accumulative processes (Mader 2016b). The predominance of these
private third-party payment systems in the Chinese market—making up
60% of all online payments—also cuts into the profit of formal (primarily
state-owned) banks, as they receive only a fraction of the transaction fee. (27)
Additionally, the state-dominated formal financial sector is being chal-
lenged by the myriad online investment funds being offered by Internet gi-
ants such as Alibaba’s Yu’ebao. (28) These funds provide higher interest than
the capped rates of state-owned banks. They are also liquid, allowing in-
vestors to withdraw money at any time and even to use their funds to make
online payments. (29) They have therefore attracted huge amounts of capital
that would have previously been saved in state-owned banks and used as
financing for investment projects, often in state-owned enterprises. Many
commentators believe this represents a necessary disruption, as they per-
ceive the stranglehold of the Chinese state-owned banks on the financial
system as undermining the country’s development (Ong 2012). They argue
that the success of China’s Internet finance providers “shows what Chinese
entrepreneurs are capable of once the government gets out of their way.” (30)
However, China’s economic miracle in the 1980s and 1990s cannot be
attributed only to the release of the Chinese people’s entrepreneurial spirit.
Rather, it was largely the result of banks and credit cooperatives funnelling
investment into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and township and village
enterprises (TVEs), thus providing large-scale employment (Bateman 2010;
Loubere and Zhang 2015). It is also worth remembering that China’s state-
dominated financial system originated in efforts to create less exploitative
financial arrangements through the expulsion of local loan sharks and big
capital from the financial sector after the establishment of the People’s Re-
public of China in 1949 (Cheng 2006). Indeed, it is exactly the symbolism
of the stable, non-exploitative state financial sector that Ezubao attempted
to co-opt in order to deceive investors prior to the company’s dramatic col-
lapse. From this perspective, it is possible to argue, as CCTV commentator
Niu Wenxin did, that online investment funds are “financial parasites” that
“profit from raising economic costs for the entire society.” (31)
At the core of the conceptualisation of digital financial inclusion as a driver
of beneficial development is a fundamental shift in developmental thinking
in China, as well as a restructuring of the relationship between the state
and its citizens. In the 1980s and early 1990s, development programmes
largely focussed on transferring resources to directly deal with poverty and
marginalisation, particularly in the countryside. However, in 1994 micro-
credit became the main element in the government’s flagship development
strategy—the 8-7 National Poverty Reduction Programme (guojia baqi
fupin gongjian jihua 国家八七扶贫攻坚计划) —in an attempt to achieve
more financially sustainable development (Tsai 2004). In this way, loans and
debt replaced direct transfers of resources from the centre to the margins
as a development approach. The massive industrial restructuring of China’s
SOEs in the late 1990s was also followed by a new microcredit programme
aimed at helping the tens of millions of laid-off workers to help themselves
through entrepreneurial activity (Loubere 2016). This not only had serious
implications for the individuals involved by pushing them out of stable iron
rice bowl employment into precarious debt-fuelled entrepreneurial activi-
ties, but also represented the abandonment of China’s highly successful de-
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velopment strategy based on supporting large enterprises capable of pro-
viding employment across society. As Aneel Karnani points out: “If societies
are serious about helping the poorest of the poor, they should stop investing
in microfinance and start supporting large, labor-intensive industries” (Kar-
nani 2007, p. 34).
Key to this renegotiation of the provision of employment and welfare in
contemporary China is a neoliberal pushing-off of responsibility from the
state to the mythical individual entrepreneur. Financial inclusion implies
that the state and other development actors are no longer responsible for
providing developmental outcomes. Instead, they are responsible for pro-
viding developmental opportunities by enabling entrepreneurship (Mader
2016b). Underpinning this is the idea that marginal people are, in some
ways, responsible for their own impoverishment due to the fact that they
tend to make worse economic decisions than non-marginal people (World
Bank 2015). (32) Increased access to financial services—often paired with fi-
nancial literacy training—is therefore seen as providing them with the op-
portunity to make better decisions going forward. In this way, financial
inclusion should not be seen as primarily inducing bottom-up socioeco-
nomic development, as its proponents suggest. Rather, it serves to relocate
the locus of developmental responsibility to the poor themselves, thereby
de-linking the condition of marginality from its historical and contextual
roots. This means that “the poor can once more rather neatly be blamed
for their own poverty” (Bateman 2015, pp.  16-17), releasing the non-
marginal from any obligation other than identifying ways to include
marginal areas and people into the economy—at a profit, of course. This
mirrors shifts in Chinese developmental thinking, away from a paternalistic
state-led approach and towards a focus on self-sufficiency through “hu-
manistic modernisation” (rende xiandaihua 人的现代化) and the promotion
of a “sharing economy” that will allow people to help each other, and help
themselves, through increased entrepreneurialism (Loubere 2016). (33)
Inclusive surveillance
Proponents of the financial inclusion narrative depict this shift of respon-
sibility to the individual as an inherently democratic expansion of freedom.
However, if we carefully examine the promises of increased access to fi-
nancial services and resources, it becomes clear that it only entails a specific
type of freedom—the freedom to engage in entrepreneurial and consumer
activities within the neoliberal economic system. It also becomes evident
that this freedom has the potential to substantially erode or constrain other
types of freedom—particularly in the digital sphere.
In the case of China, the government’s support for the booming Internet
finance industry, and its promotion of financial inclusion more generally, is
explicitly linked to a wider project of socially engineering a “more civilised”
nation through the improvement of the natural, psychological, and social
“quality” (suzhi 素质) of its citizens (Barmé and Goldkorn 2013). A key com-
ponent of this civilisation project is the construction of a nationwide social
credit system (geren chengxin tixi 个人诚信体系) aimed at “building an en-
vironment of trust” in society. (34) The proposed system would gather per-
sonal data and issue citizens and businesses with scores based on their
economic and social activities, thereby incentivising good behaviour by
“providing the trustworthy with benefits and disciplining the untrustwor-
thy,” and “letting integrity become a widespread social value.” (35) In this
way trustworthiness (shouxin 守信) and integrity (chengxin 诚信) are ex-
plicitly linked to financial creditworthiness (xinyong 信用). Similar to most
Chinese policy proposals, the central government is vague with regard to
how credit scores will be arrived at, or what the exact consequences of hav-
ing a good or bad score would be. However, a set of opinions put forward
by the Central Committee and the State Council does contain suggestions
for types of punishments for the untrustworthy (i.e., those with low scores),
such as restrictions on access to credit, acts of conspicuous consumption,
and certain types of employment, as well as ineligibility for titles such as
“civilised household” (wenming jiating 文明家庭) (Loubere 2017). (36)
More than 30 prefecture-level governments around the country are al-
ready piloting various social credit systems. Interestingly, the central gov-
ernment has also licenced eight Internet companies to run their own
pilots using data collected voluntarily (for now) from their users. The most
well-known example of this is Sesame Credit, run by Ant Financial (part
of the Alibaba Group). Sesame Credit uses the online consumer data gen-
erated by Alipay, which controls an 80% share of the online payment mar-
ket in China. This allows Sesame Credit to calculate credit scores using
opaque algorithms that take into account various aspects of shopping be-
haviour, with the obvious implication being that more consumption
through Alipay results in higher scores. This system is already in operation,
and Sesame Credit has partnered with a range of businesses that have
agreed to use the scores as the basis for providing certain perks, such as
access to expedited check-in at airports. (37) While modelling and piloting
by local governments is a regular part of the Chinese policy process, this
case is unusual as it involves private companies developing a policy model
as part of their commercial business. This raises questions with regard to
how (and if) public and private social credit systems will eventually be
consolidated into a single nationwide system controlled by the party-
state.
Chinese proponents of financial inclusion see the establishment of the
social credit system as a key strategy for reducing risk for lenders and
making a broadly inclusive financial system more sustainable. In Chinese
policy discourse, social credit and financial inclusion are also linked (Bai
2014). (38) Internationally, however, China’s proposed social credit system
is nearly universally vilified as peak Orwellianism by the same people and
groups who laud financial inclusion initiatives that seek to collect and op-
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erationalise data in similar ways. After the release of the 2016 Opinions
by the Central Committee and State Council, The Economist published
two high-profile articles accusing the Chinese government of inventing
“digital totalitarianism” and decrying “China’s worrying experiments with
a new form of social control.” (39) Ironically, just two months earlier they
ran an article praising the potential of psychometrics (i.e. invasive per-
sonality tests) and big data to revolutionise lending—seemingly looking
forward to:
a future in which lending is almost entirely digitised, combining psy-
chometrics with social media and mobile phone records (…). Lenders,
looking for an edge, will find ever more ways to peer into their cus-
tomers’ souls. (40)
The magazine has also praised the financial inclusion project more gen-
erally, stating: “The benefits of bringing more of the world’s 2.5 billion un-
banked into the formal financial system would be enormous.” (41)
This illustrates that many proponents of financial inclusion seemingly have
no problem with personal data being mined and used to make financial pro-
files of potential borrowers, just as long as governments are not involved. It
also exposes a central contradiction built into the foundations of the con-
cept of financial inclusion itself, but one that is nevertheless glossed over
or ignored: inclusion into the financial system supposedly empowers and
increases freedom, but in order to demonstrate creditworthiness, prospec-
tive borrowers must voluntarily provide personal information that can then
be used to mould behaviour and severely restrict freedom. Indeed, promi-
nent institutions such as the GPFI seamlessly move from discussing issues
of consumer privacy to highlighting the importance of data sharing in order
to reduce a variety of risks. (42) Moreover, while financial inclusion purports
to be customer focussed, better collection and use of big data is frequently
held up as a means of allowing lenders to better determine the creditwor-
thiness of potential clients under the guise of tailoring services to meet
their repayment capacity. (43) Involuntary inclusion into an Orwellian social
credit system is therefore the logical end point of the commercialised digital
financial inclusion project that seeks to maximise profit and minimise risk.
This may increase certain freedoms for those willing and able to work within
the China’s increasingly neoliberal socioeconomic system—such as the
adept individual entrepreneur or the happy (and wealthy) consumer. How-
ever, it undoubtedly reduces the freedoms of people who are unwilling or
unable to participate, and serves to restrict the space available for contest-
ing the dominant socioeconomic order. All of this suggests that, rather than
increasing empowerment and freedom for China’s poor and exploited citi-
zens, “digital financial inclusion, if fulfilled, would immensely empower who-
ever controls the new monetary infrastructures” (Mader 2016a, p. 78). (44)
Conclusion
This article has examined the expansion of digital financial inclusion stem-
ming from the rapid development of China’s Internet finance industry. It
outlines how the Internet finance boom has been framed within the dis-
course and practice of the global financial inclusion movement, which de-
picts the increased provision of financial services to previously excluded
populations as being inherently beneficial for individual empowerment and
freedom, as well as driving bottom-up development. The article then goes
on to extend a conceptual critique of digital financial inclusion in China by
demonstrating the ways in which these benefits have the potential to be
manifested as tyrannies—producing new forms of disempowerment, un-
dermining the potential for more equitably shared development, and lim-
iting freedom by strengthening the capacity of the state and other powerful
economic actors to exert societal control. 
In particular, the article examines the example of P2P lenders exploiting
university students by requiring nude photos as collateral; the widespread
fraud and extraction of resources perpetuated by P2P platforms and online
investment funds; and the establishment of social credit systems aimed at
heightening the surveillance capacity of the Chinese party-state in coordi-
nation with Chinese Internet giants such as Alibaba. Undoubtedly, a better-
designed regulatory framework would go a long way to reducing some of
the most audacious excesses described in this article. Nevertheless, the ex-
amples are representative of processes that are fundamental to the expan-
sion of the profit-oriented financial system, not outliers that can be willed
away with technocratic tweaks. In the words of Jedediah Purdy (2014): 
Even the banker with a humanitarian conscience will ultimately be-
have like the greediest scrooge because banking is not a posture of
the spirit but a role in an economic order. If you depart from the role,
the system’s many representatives, playing their respective roles, will
find another banker.
Indeed, the same types of destructive outcomes can be seen in more es-
tablished (and supposedly better regulated) financial industries. For exam-
ple, the financial inclusion provided by payday lenders in the United States
serves to actively push the working poor into a state of permanent indebt-
edness (Hembruff and Soederberg 2015). Large-scale fraudulent behaviour
perpetrated by major financial institutions was the impetus for the 2008
global financial crisis, which resulted in huge amounts of wealth being fun-
nelled from the lower and middle classes to the “one percent” (Harvey
2014). Finally, systems of social surveillance—controlled both by govern-
ments and private corporations—have been rapidly expanding across the
world, and their convergence with the financial system is simply the logical
conclusion of these global trends.
These examples point to the fact that while inclusion into the profit-
oriented commercial financial system may produce beneficial outcomes
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for some individuals and groups, it also serves to reproduce highly unequal
and exploitative developmental relations. They also suggest another im-
portant issue at the core of the financial inclusion discourse, but one that
is not openly acknowledged by its proponents: integration into the formal
financial and economic systems is not really voluntary. Once the inclusive
financial infrastructure is available, it dominates and shapes socioeco-
nomic existence in ways that make the use of newly accessible commer-
cial financial services essentially unavoidable. In this sense, inclusion is a
transformational proposition requiring the newly included to forsake tra-
ditional informal modes of financial organisation and adopt new forms of
financial literacy and consciousness. This domination of the financial land-
scape by a digital commercial operators also shuts down spaces for alter-
native modes of financial organisation, such as cooperative models, that
have the potential to be less exploitative and extractive than the com-
mercial financial system (Bateman 2007). Future research should focus
on digital inclusion as an act of transformation, and attempt to trace the
impact that integration into the commercial financial system has on the
social, cultural, economic, and moral worlds of newly included individuals
and groups. 
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